

2

The Twenty-First Century Risks

The twenty-first century began when the Cold War ended. During the Cold War, we believed that a third world war, a nuclear holocaust, was the worst possible threat to human security. While the use of nuclear weapons is an ever-present possibility, our more immediate concern is a much more complicated mix of political violence, crime, material deprivation, and environmental degradation. Twentieth-century militaries were developed to defeat the ground forces, air forces, and naval forces of an enemy state. The threats of the twenty-first century will more closely resemble forces of nature. The instruments of security developed in the Cold War are increasingly unsuited for managing this.

In this chapter, we tell the stories of Sarajevo and Goma, two cities that typify the kind of human insecurity experienced in many parts of the world in the twenty-first century.



Returning to Sarajevo in July 1993 in the middle of the war, on a mission to support the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Mary Kaldor

was greeted by Haris Pasovic, the theater director. "Welcome to the twenty-first century," he said. "Come and see the beginning of the end of Western civilization." At that time, what the Bosnians called the "multi-multi spirit" (multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious) of Sarejevo was being strenuously preserved. Mixed marriages and mutual celebrations of festivals were still taking place. More importantly, the city was determined to remain secular, irreverent, cultured, and as Sarajevans liked to say, "European." Because the airport was being shelled, Kaldor got stuck in Sarajevo. She spent her time doing what Sarajevans did: going to concerts and art exhibitions and, of course, to the theater. She watched a naughty English comedy performed by candlelight. It was called *How to Get Rid of Your Wife*, and the audience rocked with laughter as wives, prostitutes, men dressed up as women, and policemen frolicked about on the darkened stage—drowning out the sound of shelling outside. "What's it got to do with Sarajevo?" someone asked the director afterwards. "Everything," he said. "It's funny."

All this took place against the backdrop of war. The week before Kaldor's visit, some thirty-one people had been killed and 194 wounded. Since the siege of Sarajevo, which began in 1992, 8,871 people had been killed, including 1,401 children, and 16,660 people wounded. On the streets you could be hit by sniper fire from Serbs encamped in the hills around Sarajevo. Shelling was continuous—it felt like a permanent thunderstorm. Locals learned where to take cover and how to cross the more exposed roads—the road from the airport, for instance, was known as Snipers' Alley. You could easily get picked up by one of the more fearsome Bosnian commanders and find yourself forced to dig trenches while exposed to Serbian fire. There were some thirty-six groups who called themselves armies (militias, criminal gangs, self-defense groups) in Sarajevo alone. Crime was rife.

Imports were blocked by the siege—except what came through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) by air, which was totally inadequate. The monthly rations, which arrived by the same plane as Kaldor, included, for each family: one kilo of flour, half a kilo of rice, half a liter of oil, one tin of beef, three soaps, and a packet of biscuits for people over sixty. The black market flourished; a lot could be bought with foreign currencies or cigarettes. People were exhausting their life savings.

As one person put it, living in Sarajevo was like a very expensive foreign holiday. There was no water or electricity; gas was supplied intermittently, when permitted by the Serbs. Most of the trees in Sarajevo had been cut down for fuel. A colleague of Kaldor's, Zdravko Grebo, a professor of international law at the University of Sarajevo and chair of the Yugoslav branch of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, showed her how to soak the pages of books in water and roll them out when dry to make fuel for cooking. The works of Lenin, he told her, made particularly good fuel.

The people of Sarajevo were trying to preserve the city's multi-multi character while it was being attacked by Serb nationalists. Both Serb and Croat nationalists wanted to carve out ethnically pure territories. The technique of the nationalists was ethnic cleansing. The Serbs, for example, would start by shelling a village and terrifying the local inhabitants. They would then send in a paramilitary group with lists of rich Muslims or Croats as well as intellectuals, who would be killed and their homes looted. They would separate men and women. Men were often detained in detention camps; women were raped and expelled. Historic buildings and cultural symbols were destroyed. The long-preserved footprint of Gavrilo Princip, when he assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, sparking the First World War, was concreted over by Muslim nationalists because Princip was a Serb. The beautiful national library of Sarajevo, a unique example of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian archi-

ecture, was shelled; all of its irreplaceable manuscripts in Persian, Arabic, Latin, and all of the Yugoslav languages—which documented the “multi-multi” history of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia—went up in flames. The shreds of burned manuscripts that floated around Sarajevo were known as “black butterflies.”

Sarajevo during the siege was full of foreigners. United Nations peacekeeping troops were supposed to be delivering humanitarian assistance. International agencies like UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross were represented. There were international NGOs and solidarity groups like the women’s groups who delivered humanitarian aid in vans called Faith and Hysteria. The Montpellier branch of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly had established an office in Sarajevo. There were foreign mercenaries who helped to train and equip the thirty-six armies. And, of course, there were many journalists. The foreigners were, by and large, protected from the war. They wore flak jackets and helmets to protect themselves from snipers. They had special blue passes that allowed them to cross checkpoints and move from Serb-controlled zones to Bosnian or Croat zones and back again. Many of them lived in the Holiday Inn, where they paid in foreign currency and were able to take baths or showers and eat proper food. Early in the morning, American journalists could be seen jogging along the corridors before their morning trips to report on what was happening. When they all returned after curfew at ten o’clock, dinner was served in the dining room, which was full of well-known people, like Christiane Amanpour and David Rieff, and abuzz with card games and discussions of the latest news. They all lived in a wildly different, and much healthier, reality than the Sarajevans.

Yet all of these foreigners seemed powerless to stop the war. Kaldor met General Morillon, the commander of the UN troops (who had his own chef flown out from France). He told her that he had developed plans to lift the siege of Sarajevo and that he thought

it was feasible with the troops currently in Sarajevo. He also asserted that he had the mandate to lift the siege; United Nations Security Council Resolution 770 authorized UN troops to use "all necessary means" to ensure the supply of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was what is known as a Chapter VII operation, which allows UN troops to use force even without the consent of local parties. But not until the very end of the war was the order given to lift the siege.

The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and other groups issued a long stream of proposals to the international community. They called for an international protectorate for Bosnia and Herzegovina. They called for safe havens, for lifting the siege of Sarajevo, for war-crime trials, and for protection of the civilian population from ethnic cleansing. Yet although some of these proposals were adopted, they were never fully backed and implemented. Not nearly enough troops were sent to defend the safe havens, and although the mandate was strong on paper, they never received the orders that would have allowed them to defend the safe havens. Moreover, peace proposals never got as much press coverage as violence. Kaldor, Zdravko Grebo, and Haris Pasovic held a press conference in the Holiday Inn to issue what they called the "Last-Chance Appeal for Sarajevo," but only two journalists came. The main effort of the international community was talks with the warring parties—the very people who were committing heinous war crimes.

The war finally ended when ethnic cleansing was complete. At least 100,000 people¹ were killed and more than two-thirds of the population expelled from their homes. It is true that Western aircraft shelled Serb positions at the very end of the war and that British and French ground troops lifted the siege of Sarajevo. But basically, the international community, through talks and in the Dayton Peace Accords, legalized what had happened on the ground: the partitioning of Bosnia into separate Serb, Muslim, and Croat parts. A substantial

international presence remains in the country to sustain that agreement and to prevent the few remaining flashpoints (Sarajevo, Brcko, and Mostar) from flaring up again. A hugely complicated and dysfunctional state apparatus provides jobs for the extremist parties and presides over a largely illicit economy in which unemployment is very high and crime is rampant. The "multi-multi" spirit has largely ebbed. Many young people want to leave. Sarajevo, by any reckoning, is hardly "secure."



A decade later, Shannon Beebe visited Goma in Eastern Congo, on a mission to assess the environmental impact of conflict. He flew there from Kinshasa, the capital of Democratic Republic of the Congo, on a flight with the UN Organization Mission in DR Congo (MONUC), provided by the workhorse aviation NGO Air Serv International. MONUC is one of the largest UN missions in the world. Beebe had been told that this flight was the only reliable connection between Kinshasa and the eastern provinces. Indeed, just a few days before, a passenger airliner from Goma had crashed after it struck lava at the end of the runway and then cut a swath through Goma until the wreckage came to rest in the downtown area. The U.S. embassy had banned all flights except Air Serv's MONUC shuttle flights.

The flight to Goma was magnificent, crossing over the expanse of the DRC and the lush jungle below. As the plane began its final approach into Goma a sprinkling of colored canopies started to appear in the jungle. As the plane got closer to the ground, Beebe noticed that these canopies were makeshift living quarters.

The ride from the airport to the heart of Goma was surrounded by a press of humanity. People were carrying anything and everything, by all possible means and methods along, roads that were pit-

ted and pocked enough to rake out the transmission from almost any vehicle. Driving was painstakingly slow. The only things that seemed to be perfectly at home in these conditions were the many Chinese-made motor scooters weaving in and out of traffic, people, animals, and whatever other obstacles appeared.

Beebe's driver pointed out where the airliner crash had happened. He reported that since there were no fire brigades, people had formed a human chain and put out the fires by handing cups of water in assembly-line fashion. Once the fires had burned out everything had been scavenged, including the sheet metal from the aircraft. The only things left were too heavy to lift.

Eastern Congo saw the brunt of what was known as "Africa's World War" during the late 1990s. During Beebe's visit it still suffered from the ravages of conflict between four rebel groups struggling for preeminence in various resource-rich areas. The population lived in a constant state of fear. Some estimates put the number of war dead in the Congo as high as 5 million.

This area is home to tin, coltan, cassiterite, and diamond mines. The potential Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of this region is staggering, yet instability made wealth possible for only a few political and economic predators with ties to the "democratic" government in Kinshasa, 1,000 miles away. The area was wracked by uncertainty. Politically motivated killings were commonplace; mass rapes and atrocities occurred almost daily. Despite the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in 1999, which established the MONUC mission, violence has continued unabated in eastern Congo.

Beebe eventually arrived at his hotel on the outskirts of town. It was beautifully situated on a peninsula jutting into Lake Kivu. As the driver pulled up to two heavy iron gates, he sounded the horn and then waited. A few moments later, there was movement behind the gate and a small slit opened; two eyes peered through. Beebe asked the driver why such security was necessary so far out of

town—was the place robbed or looted a lot? The driver responded, “It’s complicated.”

The owners of the hotel were of Tutsi origin, and just last week the owner’s brother had been killed. The entire family suspected that the killers were a government “hit squad” who saw the family as threats to the government—the family had money and were Tutsi. Anyone with influence in the area, not directly associated with the central government of Kinshasa, was perceived as opposition and as a threat. Inside the gates, the Karibu Resort looked like a paradise. It was pristine. Everything was perfectly manicured and cared for. The only thing that seemed a bit peculiar was that there was only one other car.

The primary focus of Beebe’s trip was to go to Virunga National Park to learn more about the illegal charcoal trade endangering the oldest national park in Africa and the killing of six Mountain Gorillas just a few months before. Sentries of the Congolese army were posted almost every other kilometer on the road leading out of Goma to the park. The soldiers lived in lean-tos or poncho liners stretched out with a pot underneath. Beebe asked the driver how long they stayed in those conditions, and he shook his head, not really wanting to discuss it. “I don’t know. Maybe a few weeks. Maybe a couple of months.” Beebe thought he didn’t understand the question and asked specifically how long the soldiers lived in these locations without relief. He shook his head again, answering, “Yes, yes. I understand. They live there. Where else will they go?”

They continued on up the road for a few hours, finally reaching the ranger station—a beautiful building constructed in the early 1920s that must have been magnificent in its heyday. Now, there was no electricity, heat, or running water of any kind. Beebe and his companion were greeted by a host of curious park rangers. The interim director of the park asked if Beebe was there to do a story on the gorilla killings. Beebe said he wasn’t, but was instead trying

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RISKS

to understand how the conflict was impacting the natural environment and people there and vice versa. The director smiled wryly and asked, "So you are actually interested in the people of Kivu? That's different."

The story he told was heartbreaking. The instability in the region had driven many rebel groups to look for income from the charcoal trade, which in North Kivu was worth nearly \$30 million per year, while locals' average salary was around \$7 per month. All groups were involved in some way with charcoaling. The groups soon realized that some of the largest and best trees were in Virunga National Park. Beebe asked if they didn't understand that there was far more revenue to be gained by ecotourism lured in by the presence of mountain gorillas than by charcoaling, with its short-term and finite potential for gain. The interim director looked at Beebe: "People are starving today. Why should they worry about something tomorrow that may never happen?" It brought home the fact that societies in conflict and in desperation will mortgage their futures simply to survive today.

areed

The rest of the story was horrible and sad. The gorilla family had been executed because of the charcoal trade. The director of Virunga National Park had been attempting to stop the charcoal-making operations. Little did he know, the director of the North Kivu province was receiving money from the trade and wanted him fired in order to continue the operation. The regional director hired one of the park rangers to assassinate the family of gorillas to make the park director look incompetent—it would be passed off as a "rebel attack" on the animals. No one knows for sure how much the park ranger was paid, but most people think he was hired for \$25.

Beebe spent most of the rest of the day speaking with the rangers and their families. Many of them had been brought up as sons of rangers, grandsons of rangers and/or nephews of rangers. Their hearts

and souls were devoted to the park and its animals. Beebe asked many of the rangers if the government was regular about paying wages. "It's complicated," and a smile, was the usual response. Beebe found out that most of the rangers had not been paid in three months; they were barely subsisting. No wonder it had been so easy to corrupt one of their number.

After spending the day in Rutshuru, Beebe returned to Goma around 11 p.m. The streets were eerily silent compared to the nights before. Beebe knew something was amiss. He asked the driver what was going on, and he shook his head, saying, "I'm not sure, but it's not good." They arrived at the hotel and the normally chatty driver left promptly, saying only, "Have a good night, sir. Stay inside." The entire front desk was abandoned.

At 2:38 a.m. Beebe awoke to a sound he knew all too well. There are only a few things in the world that sound like AK-47 gunfire. In North Kivu at 2:38 in the morning there is only one thing that sounds like AK-47 gunfire. A fierce fight had broken out not more than 100 meters away. It ended suddenly. Once the sun came up, Beebe ventured outside.

When Beebe went to check out, the hotel owner's daughter, whom he'd never met before, was at the desk. She was visibly shaking and talking rapidly on a mobile. She was interrupted twice by employees coming up to tell her something. When she finally turned to Beebe, he asked her what had happened.

"A government assassination squad from Kinshasa was sent out here to murder my father, and they attacked our house last night," she said. The family had fled a few days before to Rwanda. Against her family's wishes, she had heard of the attack and crossed back over to see what had happened. "My family has owned this land and this hotel since the early 1970s. We are business people and want nothing more than stability for this area so we can have better business. This is our country too. Why does disagreement mean death?"

Beebe asked her if she thought it was because they were ethnic Tutsis. Her answer was telling: "I don't know what the reason is, but I do know we will get rebel protection now. What other choices do we have?"

Beebe nodded, "Yes, it's complicated."



Sarajevo and Goma represent the tragic underside of what we call globalization. Sarajevo was a middle-income city in Europe. Goma is a potentially rich city in Africa. Yet both have been engulfed by the typical twenty-first-century pattern of violence. Both cities are located in formerly authoritarian states that were massively weakened by opening up to the world. Yugoslavia was communist, even if its form of communism was mild by Soviet standards. The Congo had experienced periodic conflict since independence and had been ruled by a mad, brutal military dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had siphoned away much wealth.

The term *globalization* is a catchall to refer to new features of the twenty-first century. It has something do with increased information, communication, and travel. It has something to do with the interconnectedness of people in different countries, organizations, and businesses. And it sometimes just means a global market, freer trade, and more foreign investment. But specifically what does globalization mean for places like Sarajevo or Goma?

In social and economic terms, globalization means a shift from place-based, often state-dominated sectors like agriculture and industry to a "weightless economy" centered on sectors like finance, design, or marketing, as well as myriad services (both formal and informal). The rise of the weightless economy has also meant the rise of a global middle class that speaks one of the world languages, communicates through the Internet and mobile phones, travels by air, and watches

various world TV channels. In places like China and India, millions have been pulled out of poverty by success in the global market.

But at the same time, millions have been thrown out of work by a combination of state mismanagement and competition from the global market. Yugoslavia, for example, began its economic opening to the outside world in the early 1980s when it turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. While the middle classes in places like Sarajevo could travel and speak English, many rural workers who owned small plots in the countryside and came to work in state-owned factories lost their jobs. It was young men of this type who formed the backbone of the nationalist militias and who resented the cosmopolitans in the towns.² The unscrupulous entrepreneurs of violence who manipulated this situation were often engaged in large-scale corruption and crime at the interstices of the state-controlled economy. One of the big figures of the Belgrade underground, whose militia, the "Tigers," carried out some of the worst atrocities, was known as Arkan; he owned a string of pizza parlors that were covers for the drug trade. The war dramatically accelerated these developments. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, industrial production was more or less wiped out and national income fell by 90 percent while crime flourished. Looting, pillaging, smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, extraction of remittances from abroad through restriction of necessities at checkpoints, and "taxation" of humanitarian aid all became essential elements of the war economy. Even though there has been economic growth since the war's end, local and transnational crime and joblessness are still very high.

In DRC, or Zaire, as it was known between 1971 and 1997, the formal economy fell precipitously at the turn of the twenty-first century. Gross Domestic Product per capita fell from \$380 in 1985 to \$224 in 1990 to \$85 (\$0.23 a day) in 2000, making it one of the poorest countries in the world.³ The formal economy basically collapsed

through a combination of pervasive corruption and the inability to compete in world markets for basic commodities even before the war compounded these ills, engulfing the country in hyperinflation, epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, and unthinkable levels of impoverishment. An Amnesty International report details the ways in which the war provided opportunities to make money via activities such as looting (which was often accompanied by torture, killing, and/or rape), targeting harvests, stealing from medical centers, attacking and robbing villages, systematically pillaging food aid, and sexual exploitation.⁴ Particularly important was the competition to control mineral wealth, including water, diamonds, coltan, cassiterite, tin, copper, timber, and, as Beebe found, charcoal. There is a growing demand for coltan for use in computers and mobile phones.

Although GDP per capita has recovered since the international effort, as happens in many post-conflict situations, human-development indicators such as life expectancy, literacy, and access to water and clean sanitation have continued to fall. In 2009, the DRC ranked 176th out of 182 in the UN's Human Development Report.⁵

There is a growing gap between ordinary people in DRC and a new global middle class, partly created by the international effort. Beebe saw this gap clearly when returning to Kinshasa to stay in the Grand Hotel. He might have been anywhere in the world. There were numerous shops, boutiques, and restaurants filled with goods from Europe, telephone cards, and CDs. In the restaurants sat large Congolese men surrounded by bodyguards. A few of them sat alone with just their protection squads standing watch, talking rapidly and animatedly on their mobile phones while others enjoyed the company of very attractive young women. In a country where over half the population lives on less than \$1 per day, Beebe found that the simple task of checking e-mail in the hotel's business center cost \$20—almost a month's wages for a local.

Up to now, the growth of the global market has been based on twentieth-century technology, particularly the use of fossil fuels. This has led to global warming, the loss of biological diversity, deforestation, pollution, shortages of resources, and the advent of environmental refugees. In both Sarajevo and Goma, the cutting down of trees for immediate survival imperils the long-term future of the planet. Twenty-first-century technologies offer more of the same but also the possibility of conservation and environmental protection.

Globalization has also wrought a profound cultural and ideological transformation. States like Yugoslavia and DRC lost their information monopolies. They could not sustain communism (in Yugoslavia) or postcolonial nationalism (in Congo). On the one hand, global communications have made possible much greater awareness of our shared human fate, of human-rights abuses in different parts of the world, and of the interdependence of the environment, health, and energy. On the other hand, local radio and television broadcasts in local languages, videos, and mobile phones reach people who do not have the reading habit and make possible mobilization of insecurity around various exclusive ideologies. The war in DRC was a spillover from the genocide in Rwanda, when hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were killed by the Hutu regime. There, the regime used the radio stations *Radio Rwanda* and *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) to mobilize ordinary Hutus to join the government-organized militias in a killing spree. In the former Yugoslavia, television was in the hands of different national republics. In the years leading up to the wars, a war in the imagination was already being conducted on television; people got swept up in historical narratives that shaped their understandings of the current conflict. Serbian television, for example, interspersed current events with stories about the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 (when Ottoman Turkey de-

feated Serbia) and World War II (when a fascist Croatian regime killed Serbs along with Jews and Roma in concentration camps). As David Rieff reported in his gripping account of the war in Bosnia, young men in the hills above Sarajevo saw themselves as “ridding Europe of the Turks.”⁶

In both Africa and the Balkans, stories circulated through Web sites, mobile phones, and videos—mobilizing sentiment among diasporas in other countries. In the Bosnian war, Croatian “weekend fighters” would come from Germany, where they worked, to join in what appeared like a fictional adventure.

In political terms, the formal political world has become more multipolar and multilateral under globalization. Global politics involving new multilateral institutions, states, emerging powers, and a range of non-state actors including international NGOs and global social movements is increasingly supplanting international relations, the world of strategy, and state-to-state diplomacy.

All states have to engage in a multilateral process. States remain the repositories of sovereignty and the key members of the multilateral system, but they no longer have the same hegemony of action or decision on the world stage.

For example, the global effort to stem climate change—the Kyoto Protocol—was formally negotiated among 170 countries. International agencies like the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also took part in the negotiations. Some 250 NGOs, including both businesses and environmental groups, as well as local authorities, observed the negotiations and lobbied governments—some of the environmental NGO’s were organized into the Climate Action network.⁷ The International Criminal Court (ICC) was an initiative of ten to fifteen “like-minded” countries, but the negotiations also involved a powerful

network of NGOs—the Coalition for the International Criminal Court—and were hosted and promoted by the United Nations.⁸

These changes have created a hugely contradictory situation. Important decisions are made at a global level, but the basis of politics, particularly democratic politics, is still national. On the one hand, global communications makes it difficult for states to maintain information monopolies, and more and more people are demanding democracy. On the other, often states cannot respond to democratic demands because they are dependent on multinational corporations, international financial institutions like the IMF, or multilateral processes like the Kyoto Protocol or the ICC.

Indeed some states, caught between domestic struggles and outside pressures, have not been able to manage the transition to a more multilateral world. The domestic consensus that underpinned their rule has disappeared. They have been undermined by falling revenue—formal economies have declined; external aid has decreased (especially since the loss of superpower patrons at the end of the Cold War), and rapacious government officials have stolen significant amounts of the remaining funds. These states have lost legitimacy; their ruling ideologies appear increasingly hollow and they are less and less able to provide services or maintain infrastructure. They have been pulled apart by ethnic, religious, and tribal claims.

Perhaps the most important aspect of state weakness has been the loss of the monopoly on violence. For some countries, as in Europe, this is a result of transnationalization. Armed forces are integrated into multilateral security arrangements like NATO, and a range of international treaties has led to more and more arrangements for mutual exercises and inspections. But this is also a result of the privatization of violence.

Military technology has become more accurate and lethal. That is one reason twentieth century wars, in which armed forces fight

each other on the battlefield, have become so rare. Clashes between symmetrical opponents would lead to immensely destructive stalemates, as in the Iran-Iraq war. At the same time, simple, light, easy-to-use weapons can be acquired by non-state actors, even children, and used against unprotected targets. Authoritarian states tend to proliferate security services so as to play them against each other. As states can no longer afford high levels of military spending nor the cost of maintaining law and order, bits of the insecurity services break off; redundant or unpaid soldiers sell their services and their weapons to all sorts of political and criminal groups. Hence the spread of asymmetric violence, where civilians and population centers are leveraged as part of the warfare and crime. *JL.*

In Yugoslavia, for example, territorial defense units (TOs) were introduced in the 1970s after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They were trained and equipped for guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion. Yugoslavs participated in the military effort and often owned their own weapons. As Serbia started to use the Yugoslav National Army, the separate republics started to arm the TOs and the police with surplus weapons acquired from Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. All sides started to recruit paramilitary and other armed groups. Foreign mercenaries were also involved; redundant British, French, and Italian soldiers helped to train many of the gangs, while mujahideen from the Soviet war in Afghanistan came to "help" the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Some of them married locals and stayed.)

Under Mobutu, Congolese unpaid soldiers were encouraged to loot and pillage. Mobutu made desperate attempts to hold on to power by creating more and more security services. In addition to the army, there were border guards, a presidential guard, a gendarmerie, and various types of internal security forces. In the end, Mobutu could only rely on his personal guard to protect him. Meanwhile, the security forces that were no longer paid formed

their own paramilitary groups, all of which had easy access to weapons—both Cold War surplus and the CIA's use of the Congo as a conduit to supply weapons to Angolan rebels offered steady streams of arms through DRC.

Organizational forms have also changed in the global era. In place of the centralized, vertical, and hierarchical organizations of the twentieth century (e.g., militaries) are loose horizontal networks that link groups at all levels of society. Robert Reich likens the organizational structures of big corporations to spider webs; the proud names of companies have become brands or fronts for a complex mix of partnerships and subcontracts. Others talk of the "hollow" corporation, a description that also applies to politics—to governments, whose ministers are increasingly brokers of domestic interests and international agreements; to civil society, with its networks and coalitions of NGOs, social movements, and civic institutions like churches and universities; and to entrepreneurs of violence, who can now rally forces from global networks of disenfranchisement and despair. In Yugoslavia, the strategy of ethnic cleansing was carried out by networks of paramilitary groups and regular forces—that is, the Serbian army, which succeeded the Yugoslav National Army and the republican TOs. In DRC, the rebels under Laurent Nkunda were Congolese soldiers, Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge, as well as Rwandan, Ugandan, and some Burundian government troops. The government side was also backed by the armed forces of neighboring states, including Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. All sides mainly attacked civilian areas rather than each other.

So globalization has its good and bad sides. It has led to dramatic economic growth; it has increased our awareness that we live on a shared planet and are part of a single human community; it has spread openness and democracy; more and more states cooperate and are part of multilateral arrangements; organizations are less top-

down and hierarchical; and there is more scope for individuals. But these changes have also created the dark underbelly of globalization—the combination of deprivation, exclusive ideologies, environmental and economic vulnerabilities, crime, and weak states that has given rise to networks of desperation (what are often described as creeping vulnerabilities or asymmetric risks or threats).

In violent upheavals, all the conditions that led to violence are made worse. The formal economy collapses and the state becomes even weaker. Young men often have little choice but to join the fighting or a criminal group. The war produces fear and hatred among ethnic or religious groups and thus helps to underpin exclusive ideologies. The need to finance the war further spreads criminality, which in turn further weakens the rule of law. This is why contemporary conflicts are so difficult to end; they strengthen the vested political and economic interests in war and create a vortex of violence. The warring parties need the war to mobilize extremist ideologies and to carry on the criminal activities (looting; pillaging; smuggling; trading in drugs, people, or valuables) through which the war is financed. Hence terms like *persistent*, *unending*, or *forever wars*.

New wars are not only difficult to contain in time; they are also difficult to contain in space. They spread through refugees and displaced persons; through transnational criminal activities; and through polarizing activities. They are the epicenter of “bad neighbourhoods” like the Horn of Africa, the Upper Nile, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

There are international efforts to address these new phenomena. In both Yugoslavia and DRC there were peacekeeping troops. But although they were mandated to protect civilians, both the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and the UN Organization Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) saw their tasks in military terms: to separate the opposing sides in the conflicts. These forces

THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IS NO WEAPON

do not have enough troops and are not trained and equipped for this kind of task. They remain caught in twentieth-century military thinking in which soldiers are used to fight on one side or the other or to separate warring parties after a cease-fire. There is no doubt that the United Nations has been through a learning process over the past decade. UN forces have gotten better at helping to negotiate and sustain cease-fires, but they have not yet succeeded in providing human security.

Globalization does offer the possibility of a more cooperative world based on the idea of a single human community and the extension of law and politics across borders, but despite the growth of multilateralism there are mammoth obstacles in constructing such a world—obstacles that have to do with the national basis of politics and the difficulty of reorienting economic and environmental priorities. Not least is the difficulty of reorienting the way we think about security.

Twentieth-century solutions—for example, the use of military forces to fight wars in fragile situations—make things even worse. Twentieth-century military forces that once *produced* security may well be responsible for *consuming* security in the twenty-first century. If we maintain traditional ways of thinking along parochial institutional lines we will tend to destabilize rather than reinforce fragile systems. The use of military force to attack a house of cards can have catastrophic consequences. This is what happened after President George W. Bush announced the War on Terror.

3

The Twentieth-Century Mindset

The American victory in 1945 was perhaps the most glittering moment in American history. The Nazi threat had been defeated and democracy had been restored or established in Western Europe and Japan. Americans had been mobilized in the war effort, churning out more tanks, aircraft, and weapons than all American allies and enemies combined. The war was a triumph for American science and technology—in particular, for the new technique of mass production tied to the use of oil, the use of airpower, and the invention and first use of nuclear weapons. By the end of the war, the specter of unemployment seemed to have vanished and Gross National Product had leapt by 63 percent. Although nearly half a million American soldiers were killed in the war, the continental United States remained untouched.

Every American leader after the war felt compelled to remind the American public of that glittering moment. The story of America's moral crusade for freedom, supported by American technological know-how, has become the dominant narrative of the American state. The Cold War between the West and Communism that followed World War II froze that glittering moment. It was based on the same ideas: that America was ready to go to war to fight for freedom using all of the massive technological and industrial capabilities at

its disposal and that war consisted of battles between armed forces in which the aim is total destruction of the enemy. Huge armies faced each other across the Fulda Gap in Germany for forty years, in readiness for World War III. Tens of thousands of long-range missiles and other high-tech weapons were permanently mobilized for potential use. Many of the same corporate giants that were so important in World War II developed and produced new generations of weapons and equipment to sustain this effort. The Cold War was largely fought in the imagination, at least in Europe, and so there were far fewer casualties, except in the proxy wars outside Europe.

The war in Vietnam (1965 to 1973) should have challenged the story.¹ In Vietnam, Americans faced what would now be called an asymmetric enemy. Insurgents fought a guerrilla war in which they avoided battle against a superior enemy. Instead they aimed to wear down the Americans and to win the "hearts and minds" of the population.

The heavy-handed American conception of war "as a crusade to be won quickly and completely . . . using high technology and almost unlimited firepower"² devastated the countryside and alienated the Vietnamese people, creating more recruits to the insurgency. The chilling metrics of the war were combat missions flown, numbers of targets achieved, and numbers of insurgents killed (many of them probably civilians). Technologies like herbicides to destroy food sources and napalm to burn villages remain seared on the history of that conflict.

The war caused a crisis in the American military establishment, with high levels of desertion, reported "fragging" (killing one's own officers), combat refusals, and drug addiction.³ And growing awareness of what was going on, even before the Internet and satellite television, created a massive domestic opposition within the United States. In the end, the Americans were forced to withdraw and the

insurgents, the Vietcong, backed by the government of North Vietnam, took over the country.

There were dissidents within the U.S. military at the time who proposed an alternative approach. In 1940, the U.S. Marines had published a manual entitled *Small Wars*, which proposed a different way of dealing with insurgencies, drawing on the colonial experience, especially the experience of the United States in the Philippines, and putting the emphasis on controlling local populations. But there was great resistance to changing course because the so-called "American Way of War" was so embedded in American military and industrial institutions. "I'll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions and traditions, to be destroyed just to win this lousy war," said one senior officer.⁴

←
bird

Of course, many articles and books written after Vietnam criticized the way the war was fought, arguing that less-destructive methods might have been more effective. But the defense establishment chose to learn a different lesson. They argued that the war was not destructive enough, and some even went so far as to suggest that nuclear weapons should have been used.

Colonel Harry Summers's 1982 book, *A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, which made the case for an even more destructive approach, reflected the majority view within the military establishment.⁵

In the 1970s and 1980s, there were efforts to adapt American warfare to new technologies, particularly information and communications technologies. Terms like "AirLand Battle" and, later, the "Revolution in Military Affairs" were supposed to herald far-reaching technology-induced changes in the U.S. military. But actually, the technologies were integrated into existing doctrines and institutions. The new technologies were supposed to increase speed, accuracy, and destructiveness and, at the same time, to improve force protection. In particular, there was a growing emphasis

on airpower as a way of demonstrating American military superiority without risking American casualties so that the kind of opposition that developed during the Vietnam years would not be repeated. This would become known in military circles as “Nintendo Warfare.”

Learning the Wrong Lessons

The Cold War ended because the Soviet Union and Central Europe imploded. The central planning system was too rigid and could not assimilate new technology or increases in productivity. Communism had lost its ideological appeal. The Soviet army that intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 was forced to withdraw, with ruinous consequences for political and military morale. The Polish mass trades union, Solidarity, strongly supported by the Catholic Church, and the peace movement in East Germany that had developed under the umbrella of the Protestant churches had opened up new civil-society spaces and new demands in Eastern Europe.

The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, who wanted to restructure the Soviet economy and society and to develop a new cooperative approach to foreign policy, set in motion an irreversible process that led to the collapse of communism.

Western leaders, political commentators, and foreign-policy scholars and specialists were stunned. For about a year, they agonized in think tanks, universities, and government departments about why they had failed to predict the end of the Cold War.

And then they came up with the answer—an answer seen through the prism of that glittering moment at the end of World War II: *America had “won” the Cold War!* Communism collapsed because the United States had stayed firm throughout the forty-year history of the Cold War, maintaining and upgrading a huge military capability that threatened the Soviet Union—in particular,

a new generation of high-technology weapons, ordered by President Reagan, that the Soviet Union could not match. It was American resolve that had brought the Soviet Union to its knees.

“What is clear,” proclaimed the *Wall Street Journal*, “is that in the fourth decade of the East’s imprisonment, the U.S. and its allies determined to stand up more firmly than ever to the ‘other force’ and that the Soviet Union decided to stand down.”⁶ Or, as former national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put it: “The massive U.S. defense buildup of the early 1980s—including the decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative—both shocked the Soviets and then strained their resources.”⁷

It was an argument that could not be refuted because there was no actual conflict. One could equally well argue that the Western threat had sustained communist power by helping to establish an us-versus-them mentality that strengthened the hardliners in the Kremlin. Indeed, it is more convincing to suggest that it was President Reagan’s arms control offers—the zero option to get rid of medium range missiles and the strategic missile reductions—that provided an opportunity for change in the Soviet Union.

This kind of argument was to be repeated in every post-Cold War crisis. It explained why it was not necessary to dismantle the huge military-industrial edifice built up during World War II and the Cold War, and why the military did not need to change its philosophy about how to fight wars with overwhelming force.

Military spending did fall after the end of the Cold War, but spending on research and development—that is, on the military systems of the future—remained at the same level. In strategic think tanks and security consultancies, experts whose ideas had been formed by the Cold War were busy thinking up new enemies with new, inventive ways of attacking America—rogue states armed with missiles, lone terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction—and new ways of capitalizing on America’s “unipolar moment.”

They did not actually anticipate 9/11, but it was the kind of scenario they had been imagining; indeed, the Project for the New American Century, which, along with the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, was to provide much of the intellectual input into George W. Bush's administration, suggested that the kind of defense build-up they envisaged would be difficult without some "catastrophic and catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor."⁸

The first post-Cold War crisis was the Gulf War of 1991, which provided a showy opportunity to exhibit the technological developments of the past two decades. In effect, it was a demonstration to the world of the Revolution in Military Affairs. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United States responded massively, with the support of the United Nations. Half a million Coalition troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia, and the Pentagon rolled out Operation 90-1002 (pronounced Ten-Oh-Two), which had been developed in the early 1980s to contain a southward thrust by the Soviet Union. Cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, early GPS systems, and satellite imagery were all magnificently displayed. After years of war with Iran, Iraq had large numbers of poorly trained and poorly equipped soldiers, but not much else. In effect, Iraq was elevated to the status of superpower by the scale of forces arrayed against it.

This hugely expensive show resulted in the liberation of Kuwait with very few American casualties—some 148 American troops were killed, one-third of them by friendly fire. It seemed like a dazzling success for the combination of morality, massive firepower, and technological prowess. Very few people questioned whether Saddam Hussein could have been dealt with at less cost, in terms of money, deaths, and destruction, or in some other way. "One thing is clear," said President George H. W. Bush, "we have licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."⁹

American policy makers went on to draw similar conclusions about the importance of conventional military power, especially

airpower, from the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In the final stages of the Bosnian War, NATO airplanes bombed Serb positions. Even though by this time ethnic cleansing was largely complete and the map of Bosnia (and Croatia) had been largely reconfigured along ethnic lines, many U.S. policy makers regarded the bombing as decisive. In a speech he gave soon after the Dayton Peace Accords was signed, President Clinton argued that “[t]hose air strikes, together with the renewed determination of our European partners, and the Bosnian and Croat gains on the battlefield, convinced the Serbs, finally, to start thinking about making peace.”¹⁰ And according to the secretary of defense, William J. Perry, the air campaign “was an absolutely stunning development to them [the Serbs]. It totally demoralized them and drove them effectively to the peace table.”¹¹

That lesson drawn from the final stages of the Bosnian War was to be applied in Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo had been left out of the Dayton Peace Accords, which focussed on ending the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though the crisis had been brewing since 1990, when Milosevic removed the autonomous status of Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians, who constituted 90 percent of the population, had been dismissed from public service and excluded from secondary schools and universities. The Albanian Kosovars, influenced by the peaceful 1989 revolutions, organized themselves in a nonviolent movement. They held their own referendum on independence in September 1991 and Kosovo-wide elections in May 1992. They organized a parallel education system as well as independent Albanian newspapers and NGOs for health care, human-rights monitoring, and other activities. And they funded all this through individual voluntary contributions from Kosovars both at home and abroad.

But by the late 1990s, the parallel system was becoming exhausted and a new group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), committed to violent strategies, began to gather adherents. As Veton

Surroi, one of the most significant independent intellectuals, put it, Dayton had demonstrated that “ethnic territories have legitimacy” and that “international attention can only be obtained through war.”¹² An additional factor was the sudden availability of arms after the Albanian state collapsed in the summer of 1997; arms caches were opened and hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs were available for sale at a few dollars each. Many Kosovar Albanians abroad switched their donations to the “Homeland Calling” fund organized by the KLA.

Slobodan Milosevic responded with typical brutality, and there were widespread fears of large-scale ethnic cleansing on the Bosnian model. The extreme right-wing radical party that had been directly responsible for many of the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by Vojislav Seselj (who is now in The Hague awaiting trial), had joined the governing coalition in Serbia. Since 1991, the party had advocated the expulsion “without delay” of all Kosovar Albanians.

The method chosen by Western leaders to stop ethnic cleansing, as a result of their reading of the Bosnia conflict, was diplomacy—backed by the threat of air strikes. When diplomacy failed to stop the conflict, NATO responded with a 77-day air campaign. Altogether, some 36,000 sorties were flown, of which 12,000 were strike sorties. Some 20,000 “smart” bombs and 5,000 conventional bombs were dropped. But it appears that not much damage was done to the Yugoslav military machine. For fifty years, the Yugoslav army had been trained to withstand a superior enemy. A vast underground network had been built, including stores, airports, and barracks. Tactics had been developed that involved constructing decoys, hiding tanks and artillery, conserving air defenses, and avoiding troop concentrations. NATO did not succeed, in the initial stages, in knocking out the Yugoslav air-defense system; that is why NATO aircraft continued to fly at 15,000 feet.

NATO was more successful in hitting civilian targets—roads, bridges, power stations, oil depots, and factories. Because of the insistence that aircraft fly above 15,000 feet, pilots could not see what was happening on the ground and were dependent on intelligence from numerous, often badly coordinated, sources. Consequently, repeated mistakes were made, as became embarrassingly clear for the duration of the air strikes. Low points included the bombing of the Chinese Embassy and the bombing of refugees inside Kosovo. The killing of some 1,400 people was called “collateral damage.” Environmental damage resulted from attacks on industrial facilities. Historic sites were destroyed in places such as Novi Sad. A TV transmitter was destroyed, and journalists in the building were killed. And targets were hit in Montenegro, whose government had refused to participate in the war in Kosovo.

Serbia used the bombing as a cover to accelerate ethnic cleansing. Many of the paramilitary groups that had undertaken the dirty work in Bosnia reappeared in Kosovo. During the bombing, 10,000 or so Albanians were killed; 863,000 civilians were forced to seek refuge outside Kosovo, and an additional 590,000 were internally displaced. Kosovar Albanians were subjected to widespread rape and torture as well as looting, pillaging, and extortion.¹³ As General Wesley Clark, who commanded the NATO forces, put it: “air power alone cannot stop paramilitary murder on the ground and that’s what’s going on down there.”¹⁴

In the end, Milosevic capitulated and agreed to NATO’s demands. Right up until the last few days, no one expected that he would concede defeat. Crucial factors seem to have been the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the loss of support from some of Milosevic’s inner circle, and, above all, the intervention of the Russians, who made it clear that they could not continue to support the Yugoslav position. It is also sometimes asserted that Milosevic was influenced by NATO discussions about ground intervention, al-

though even if, as is claimed, a decision were imminent, it would have taken some time to organize.

The air strikes both contributed to the fall of Milosevic and, together with economic sanctions, helped to precipitate economic collapse, but they also helped to entrench embittered anti-Western nationalistic attitudes that persist to this day.

Western leaders were triumphant. "This is the first war for human rights," declared the British prime minister, Tony Blair.¹⁵ "If one can say of any war that it is ethical, or that it is being waged for ethical reasons, then it is true of this war," said the Czech president and former dissident Vaclav Havel.¹⁶ And according to Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian foreign minister, "NATO prevailed over evil . . . The Alliance's intervention was an important step in the ascendance of human security as a norm for global action."¹⁷ Indeed, the war seemed not only to reinforce the conservative view that technologically advanced conventional military force is the way to defeat America's enemies, but it also attracted liberals to the idea that conventional military force could be used for humanitarian purposes.

The lessons that were drawn from the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo reproduced the twentieth-century mindset—the idea that conventional military force can be used to prevail over enemies and to promote democracy and human rights. The lessons of the intervention in Somalia in 1992, which ended in debacle, were ignored. U.S. forces went to Somalia in the midst of a "new war" to deliver humanitarian aid and provide food security. However, attacks on Pakistani troops led the American commander, Admiral Jonathan Howe, to engage in warfare against the clan faction responsible, led by General Aideed. Despite the use of what many considered to be excessive force, the Americans failed to capture Aideed.

On the contrary, Somali militia succeeded in shooting down two American helicopters, killing eighteen American soldiers and

wounding seventy-five. The bodies of the American soldiers were paraded publicly in front of international television cameras. Shortly thereafter, the Clinton administration decided to withdraw from Somalia. The failure of the Somali intervention was one reason the Clinton administration was so reluctant to intervene in the Rwandan genocide.

That Americans chose to learn some lessons and not others has to be explained in terms of the deeply embedded structures of the American way of war. This is not a conspiratorial argument about vested interests. Rather it is about how narratives of power are built into the ways institutions function. The wrong lessons are rewarded in institutional and career terms. People who work in institutions—the armed forces, the defense industry, bureaucracies, Congress, the media—tend to reinforce each others' received wisdom and by so doing reproduce their careers. American leaders made successive misjudgments about the value of force because their thinking was so bound up in the unique success of World War II and their experiences were shaped by the institutions established during that period and sustained by the Cold War.

Beebe experienced this deep-rooted thinking first hand. When, in the mid-1990s, he returned from an assignment in Germany, where he had watched Somalia, the beginnings of the Balkan conflict, and Haiti unravel, he attended the U.S. Army Field Artillery Advanced Course. One day, he and several hundred other captains gathered in Snow Hall to hear a senior Army general discuss his vision of the future and what young officers should be prepared for. He spoke of the importance of being physically fit and ready to lead soldiers into combat. He spoke of the downsizing of the Army.

He also spoke of the future of the field artillery with the new Crusader Howitzer. This system would be able to attack and kill more with less personnel. It would also be the heaviest self-propelled 155mm howitzer ever built—almost twice the weight of its

predecessor. This would be necessary to keep ahead of “near-peer” threats of the twenty-first century, claimed the general.

During the question-and-answer session, Beebe posed a simple question: “Do you think conflict of the twenty-first century will be like what we’ve seen in Somalia, Haiti, or the Balkans, where this weapon system will have little relevance in an urban environment?”

The general chuckled a little, as did some of the other captains. The general looked at Beebe and replied, “Son, don’t take your eye off the ball with all this other silliness going on right now. The Army is not the world’s policeman. You stay focused on what you’re trained to do, and that’s kill the enemy that’s preparing right now to do the same to you.” Beebe sat down, a bit ashamed that he’d asked such a question.

There was, during this period, other thinking within the United Nations, within the European Union, in Canada and Japan—much of it along the lines of human security. Even in Russia, at that time, there was much interest in the idea of common security. In Eastern Europe, the human-rights ideals of those who had led the 1989 revolutions had much resonance even though governments (often former communists tagged by Rumsfeld as “new Europe”) passionately supported the American idea of security. But the United States was the dominant power, and U.S. administrations were setting the global agenda. The last unfettered expression of twentieth century thinking and language, misapplied to a twenty-first-century problem, came after September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush declared that in response to the attacks, his administration would fight a “War on Terror”—and, he might as well have added, fight it the old-fashioned way, because that is what happened.